EXPERT TESTIMONY: ITS ABUSES AND USES.*
Judge Endlich, of the Courts of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in an able address before the Pennsylvania Bar Association in July, 1898, reverts to the fact that in "England,
New York, Massachusetts, this State, and elsewhere the
subject of a change" (in expert evidence) "is undergoing
discussion and agitation." He adds, "In the appendix to
'Rogers on Expert Testimony' are collected twenty-five
judicial expressions of opinion, concerning the value of such
testimony, taken from the reports of England, of United
States Courts, and various State Courts of last resort.
Seventeen declare it to be of little value, and only eight have
a good word to say for it. Recent decisions appear to be
even more generally agreed in depreciating it, and the same
is to be said of legal text-books and journals." Furthermore, "It is a deplorable fact, patent to any one who chooses
to inform himself, that expert testimony as now received in
our Courts is looked upon by the public as an unmitigated
farce and a nuisance, etc.1 (The italics are the present
writer's.)
This presentment by an acknowledged leader in jurisprudence, and highly honored member of the judiciary indicates a vefy serious state of affairs. Defects in the machinery for the administration of justice menace the very
foundations of social order, and should be remedied at once
at all hazards. The first inquiry is naturally, "What are
experts ?" and the second, "What have they to do with. litigation?" It may seem easy to answer the first question
until you try.
The writer made several attempts, at the invitation of
Judge Endlich, to construct a definition which should satisfy
*This article supplements an article by the same authority which
appeared in TuE AMERICAN 'LAW REGISTER, Vol. 37 N. S., p. 735,
December, I898.-ED.
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both scientific and legal minds, but without entire success.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the legal mind adheres
to the guinea's stamp as a criterion of value in preference
to a determination of the real nature of the metal on which
it is impressed; while he who is not of the law regards the
quality of the metal as more important than the stamp. This
difference is not easy to adjust because it is ,rooted in
common law, and in the conceptions of a' function of a jury.
The second attempt of the writer to produce a satisfactory
* lefinition and the criticism it evoked will illustrate this:
"An expert is one who by greater power of discernment than
ordinary men [either as a gift of nature or] by reason of a
greater number of previous experiences, is better able than
they to elucidate a given question."
Two leaders of the Pennsylvania Bar were consulted.
Mr. John G. Johnson, replied that the greater power of
discernment was superfluous. If the expert has had a sufficient number of previous experiences he will-be admitted.
Mr. Samuel Dickson defined an expert-as "one having such
special knowledge as to make his opinion a reasonable ground
of belief."
The thought underlying the above -criticism and definition
is that the court does not feel called upon to ascertain the
reality of his special knowledge before accepting the expert,
and hence his appointment mist be based simply upon his
having enjoyed opportunities to become qualified, whether
or not he profited by them; or upon his success in imposing
on some other court previously as to his history or i'eputation. Both these gentlemen as well as Judge'Endlich himself (who would allow inferences to one who has "pursued
the study or had the experience") express, or imply that the
sole admissibility test of an expert is the opportunities he
may have had to become one. To the layman it seems -better
that the form in which the expert is required to give his
.testimony should, itself, furnish proof of his fitness. This
the writer sought to accomplish in the draft of a law governing expert testimony in handwriting, which is now one of the
statutes of Pennsylvania, by requiring the expert to give
first, the principles governing his procedure; second, the
facts which h obtained; third, the conclusions he draws from
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those facts. Such a statement would expose the expert to
complete annihilation at the hands of any other expert assisting the cross-examiner, unless principles, procedure, and
conclusions were sound. But it is objected by lawyers to this
principle that it removes from the jury its right to take
ratiocinative steps and reach conclusions as, by the common
law, it alone is authorized to do. The inconsistency of this
objection is appiarent if we suppose a. jury called upon to
decide whether a certain yacht has fulfilled the contract
specifications in tonnage, load line, and metacentric, from
the measurements which a shipbuilder would furnish. It is
still more apparent if we consider that judges and lawyers
hold their positions as such solely because of their expert
knowledge of law, and, though the statutes provide otherwise, it is just as reasonable to procure for a jury a list of
authorities on a point of law and ask it to reach its own
opinion of the application in a given case, as to assign that
duty exclusively to a judge, be he a Marshall or a Story;
because all the judge can do is to reason from these facts to
his conclusion. We may assume that from the legal point
of view an expert is one who has knowledge from a special
study, or unusual experience, enabling him to draw from
facts inferences which a jury would not of itself be able to
draw.
If a court be "a tribunal established for the administration of justice," the subjects whichi come before it are as
various as the interests of the community in which it exists.
These interests at the present day comprise every element
in animate and inanimate nature; and every item in Science,
Art, Literature, and Religion. To judge fairly between
litigants on any of these subjects implies that the jury comprehend the nature of the subject in dispute. Either the
court and jury must have supernatural knowledge, extending from electrical measurements to the interpretation of
hieroglyphics; or else, when exact knowledge is required
on a given subject, some one who has this knowledge must
be called upon to supply it. Such person is called an expert,
as all will agree. Intricate questions involving medical
skill must be decided to determine the cause of death or the
extent of injury. Thorough comprehension of the action
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of separate pieces of apparatus must precede a knowledge
of whether one of them infringes the patent rights of the
other. Chemical reactions of great delicacy must be interpreted to settle controversies as to value, or fulfillment of
contract. Extensive experience and intelligent investigation are necessary to demonstrate whether two writings are,
or are not, written by the same hand. It is just as clear
that special knowledge, needed in the abave cases, must come
from experts in the several classes as it is clear that the
bearing upon them of the law must come from the experts
called judges. Indeed, as the, address of Judge Endlich,
before the Pennsylvania Bar Assoiation declares, while
deploring the outcry against experts, "that expert testimony
has been so long tolerated by the courts, including those professing to despise it, and that in spite of everything its uses
are on the increase, proves that we cannot do without it,
nor ought we to wish to do without it. . . . It is not
expert testimony itself, therefore, that is an evil. The evil
lies in our way of handling it," etc. Lawyers and laymen
will agree that the modest instrument of justice known .as
an "expert" has value; the difference between them is solely
as to the best method of securing experts who really possess
this value.
The writer believes that the methods by which expert
testimony is obtained and handled are mainly responsible for
the evils which are denounced and deplored. For those
methods the bar is mainly responsible; through its exclusive
control of the legislation affecting procedure in the courts;
and through its-attitude towards these instruments who, it is
conceded, are necessary adjuncts for procuring the facts on
which the jury is to decide many cases. From attorneys,
whose code is fidelity to the cause of their clients even
"though success involve the destruction of the government,"
it is natural to expect all the arts of insinuation, detraction,
.and invective, directed against the man whose testimony
may lose one of them his case. They are advocates and
strong partisans, yet there is a striking difference between
them. The most learned and successful practitioners are
invariably the most courteous towards their opponent's expert, yet eved these do not entirely deprive themselves of the
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advantages which lurk in such questions as: "How much do
you expect tobe paid for testifying?" "You knewbeforecommencing your examination what my learned Brother
wished to prove by your testimony, did you not?" "Have you
not frequently differed in opinion from other experts, and
has not the jury frequently'reached conclusions opposite to
yours ?" These innuendoes are, strictly speaking, not quite
fair, and may be made, by tone and manner, very galling, but
from the lawyer's point of view they are not unprofessional.
Far worse and less excusable is the conduct of some judges.
Placed temporarily in a position of absolute and arbitrary
power; charged with the duty of eliciting, the truth, and
incidentally of protecting reputable witnesses from all kinds
of insult, occasionally some of them seem to welcome the
occasion to offer indignity by word and manner to expert
witnesses.
The injustices of trial judges to expert witnesses may
either be the result of a misunderstanding of the actual
significance of their testimony; or a misunderstanding of
previous decisions' of Appellate Courts towards similar
questions; or they may unjudicially allow their prejudice
to escape through contemptuous words; or they may reproach expert witnesses for that which is perfectly legal and
proper; or they may misstate the testimony either from
inattention, from lack of power of discrimination, or from
general ignorance. There are doubtless other ways in which
injustice may be done by trial judges to particular experts
and harm to expert testimony generally. The present writer
cites from his own experience of twenty-two or more years,
cases under each of these heads. The following is an example of a misunderstanding of the actual significance of
the testimony:
The owners of a valuable coal property brought suit
against the lessee for a large sum representing the difference
between the number of tons mined, as claimed by the plaintiff on the one hand, and as acknowledged by the defendant
on the other. The writer was employed by the former to
ascertain the actual facts. This was done by ascertaining
the number of cubic yards taken out by the lessee, and the
weight of a cubic yard of this coal. This lAtter determina-
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tion demands only a fair sample of the coal as large as a
walnut, 'a balance to weigh it on, and a glass, of water in
which to suspend while weighing it. All these details were
explained to the court; the number of tons ascertained to
have been removed, stated; and the witness was about to
step down from the stand, when the judge raised his hand
in restraint, while his countenance assumed an aspect of
great earnestness. "Stop! One moment," said he. "There
is a question which has not been put to this witness which
'I regard as of the greatest importance-in fact, pivotal in
the case." A hush of expectancy fell upon the court and
his Honor, fixing the witness with a look of inspiration, continued, "Do the processes you have just described exercise
any influence upon the commercial value of the coal? Now,
the fragments taken to obtain a fair average of the whole coal
bed would not together have exceeded the dimensions of a
watermelon." On recovering his speech, the witness answered "No," and was allowed to depart.
The second example shows the effect of an evident misunderstanding of the tiial judge of a prior decision of the
Appellate Court.
On or about 179o a tract of land .was purchased by compass survey, and, during the succeeding century, a very
valuable plant was erected near one of its boundary lines.
Some time in the eighteen hundred and seventies the owner
of the neighboring tract brought an ejectment suit against
the. original owners, on the ground that a survey made in
1845, and later in 1870, proved that the buildings and improvements -were on the plaintiff's land. The boundaries
had been re-established in these years by tracing the compass
directions recorded in 1790 from the indications of a compass
in i87o . It is known that in a wid6 region, embracing the
tract under consideration, the north point by the compass
has been moving slowly west of the true astronomical north
during the past century, so that its direction has never been
exactly the same on two successive years. The writer showed
to the court that starting from a stone corner which had been
preserved, and allowing for this chaige, the compass direction of 1790 included within the property the buildings of
the company; whereas, owing to the change in the magnetic
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north during the intervening time, the same number of
degrees west of north by compass in 1870 left these buildings
outside of the tract. In other words if the necessary correction be allowed, the boundary line of 1870 would lie
where tradition, and the location of the buildings, indicated
it must have lain, viz: on the outer side of these latter. But
the judge, after consulting his authorities, announced that
the Supreme Court of the state in question once having had
presented to it an argument based upon the variation of the
magnetic needle, had decided that in the particular case then
before it certain facts were established which rendered the
consideration of the argument unnecessary. Then, closing
the book, he added that this precedent of the Supreme Court
would be followed by himself; and thereupon ruled out the
testimony regarding the change of direction of the magnetic
needle, which was the essence of the whole dispute.
All the rest of the faults above enumerated are found in
a written opinion of more recent years which is herewith
quoted. (The italics are the writer's.) *
"The whole of the'libellant's case rests upon the testimony
of two alleged experts upon the subject of handwriting who
testify that in their opinion the will in question is forged,
it will be observed that neither of them testify to any fact
but to an opinion which is predicated upon an examination
made by one of them of eight letters written by the testator,
and by the other of four said letters, 'and which are admittedly genuine, and a comparison of a signature thereto with
that to the will. While both these witnesses admit that no
man ever signs his name exactly alike twice, yet they undertake to testify that because there is some slight variation or
difference between a signature to a will in 1899 and that to a
letter written in 1881, nearly twenty years previously, and
other letters written at more or less remote periods since
that, the signature to the will is forged. The genuine appearance and characteristics of all the signatures may be
similar, yet because by the aid of a microscope and measurements they can detect a slight variationof size of a signature
down to an infinitesimal fraction, a difference in the flourish
under it, a connection or disconnection between two of the
letters, a letter higher up or lower down in one signature
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than the other, and other similar variationswhich it is impossible 'to discover with the naked eye they are willing to
testify that this will is forged.. There were peihaps over a
hundred signatures which were undoubtedly made by Mr.
-put
in evidence in this case and in a great many of
them the characteristicsand peculiaritieswhich these experts
point out as a badge of forgery exist."
The statement "alleged experts" is an illustration of
the use of the contemptuous expressions by judges to which
1I have referred. The particular expression is illogical because if the judge had not considered the witnesses actually
experts he failed in his duty in allowing them to testify as
such. Again the emphasis laid by the judge on the fact
that the experts testified that "in their opinion" is reproaching them for. testifying in the only way in which the law
permits them to testify.
The last part of the opinion quoted illustrates two kinds
of misstatement. The assertion that a will is a forgery is
a statement of a legal conclusion from a combination of
facts. For an expert in handwriting to testify that a will
is a forgery is improper. The writer who as intimated was
one of the witnesses, did not testify that the will was a
forgery. He never testified thus about any signature, holding that the question of forgery is partly a question of law.
In this particular case he had no such opinion. He was and
is still firmly of the opinion that the signature was not by
the hand of the man it designated. Need it be stated that
that is a vastly different thing.? The above is an illustration of misstatement of that to which the expert testified, but
the opinion also contains an illustration of the way in which
a trial judge may misunderstand and therefore misstate the
reasons which induced the expert t6 reach his conclusions.
These conclusions, in the particular case referred to, were
reached, -not because of "some slight variation or difference
between the signature to the will," and other "admittedly
genuine signatures," but because of a number of such superficial differences (each one trifling in itself but all together
constituting an indication of some significance), were confirmed by several inherent and involuntary characteristics
which in the opinion of the witness could neither be simulated
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nor suppressed. The judge confused the superficial and
non-essential with the essential characteristics. It is true
that though two signatures may be alike to the eye, by an
examination under the microscope, their difference or origin
may be manifest through differences of structure which
belong to the domain of the "'infinitesimal," i. e., hundreths
of an inch. The character of the flourish-of the position
of letters with reference to each other, etc., in spite of the
judge's assertion to the contrary, are coarse peculiarities
which appeal to the naked eye and when by themselves are
of little weight, but cumulatively may be of some value, and
sometimes of great value, in reaching a conclusion. The
statement that many of the admitted signatures contained the
characteristics which one of the witnesses found to distinguish the disputed signature. is very extraordinary anct
reckless. If it were true, which is extremely improbable,
the fact could not possibly beknown to the person who states
it because such signatures were never examined in a manner
which would permit this fact to be ascertained.
Perhaps the last example given is an extreme one. What
concerns us here is the effect of the attitude of the bench
indicated upon the class of expert witnesses. Nothing is
truer than that every act of consideration and respect towards
an individual or a class makes that individual or class more
anxious to deserve and actually more deserving of respect.
While every indignity it is made to suffer without possible
redress, degrades it to a like extent, and if discourtesy and
misrepresentation from the bench become common, no selfrespecting man will put himself in the way of incurring it.
It is the belief of the writer that a more general extension of
the amenities to expert witnesses which a majority of judges
now accord, would go far towards solving the much discussed expert problem.
The writer would also suggest that the character of -the
expert's testimony may be raised to a judicial standard by
requiring the testimony to be introduced in a manner that
will result in exposing false or trivial statements. One such
method is found in the present act of the State of Pennsylvania above referred to. It is*as follows: (The italics are
the present writer's.)
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"It shall be competent for experts in giving their testimony
under the provisions of this-Act, to make comparison of documents and comparison of disputed handwriting with any
documents or writing admitted 'tobe genuine, or proven to
the satisfaction of the judge to be.genuine, and the evidence
of such experts respecting the same shall be submitted to the
jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the
writing in dispute.
"It shall be competent for experts in formulating
,opinions to the court and jury to place the genuine and disputed signatures or writings in juxtaposition, and to draw
the attention of the jury thereto; and it shall furthermore
be competent for counsel to require of an expert a statement
of the principles on which he has based his work, the details
of his work, and his opinion that the results are important to
the point at issue, or the reasoning, analysis2 and investigation by which he has arrived at his opinion.
This 'act virtually provides a test of competency of the
most rigorous kind. Only one suffering fron such feebleness of mind as would preclude his appearance as an expert
on general grounds would dare to incur the risk of reciting
on the witness stand as the basis of his opinion, procedures
and reasonings on their results which were untrue or inapplicable.
Persifor Fraer.
February, 19o2.
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